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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
longest and most earnestly enforced, nevertheless have held that laws
permitting and even requiring the separation of the races in places where
they are liable to be brought into contact, are within the competency of
the state legislatures, in the, exercise of their police power.8
Evidently, the government feels that when it has secured to each of
its citizens equal rights before the law and equal opportunities for im-
provement and progress, it has accomplished the end for which it was
organized, and performed all of the functions respecting social advan-
tages with which it is endowed. This, despite the fact that if the separa-
tion of scholars on the color line can be sustained, force is lent to the
contention that pupils of different nationalities can be divided. The term
colored race is but another designation for African. Clearly, then, if a
Board of Directors is clothed with a discretion to exclude African chil-
dren from the common schools and require them to attend, if at all, a
school composed wholly of children of that nationality, it may do like-
wise with any nationality. Sustaining any such action would be to
sanction a plain violation of the spirit of our laws, and would tend
to perpetuate'the national differences of our people and stimulate constant
strife, if not a'war of races.
Upon inquiring into the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court says
that it will not consider the motive in fact actuating the state legislature
in voting for its enactment. If the law does not conflict with some con-
stitutional limitation of the powers of the state legislature. it cannot be
declared invalid. Concerning the authority of the state over matters
pertaining to public schools within its limits, and the validity of legisla-
tion -f the character of that under consideration, the state has the right
to provide separate schools for the children of different races, and such
action is not forbidden by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution,
provided the schools so established make no discrimination in educational
facilities. Of the practical inconvenience of traveling many miles to a
colored school when a public school for white children is within a stone's
throw, the Court is silent, the question not having been raised.
Will the Supreme Court of the United States say, with Rosseau,
when again faced with a similar situation, "It is precisely because the
force of things tends always to destroy equality that the force of legisla-
tion ought always to tend to maintain it," and if there be any doubt,
incline in favor of equality?
J.M.
RIGHT OF LABOR UNION TO SOLICIT MEMBERS.-The recent decision
at the New York County Special Term in the suit of Interborough
8Supra note 6.
NOTES AND COMMENT
Rapid Transit Company v. William Green, individually and as President
of American Federation of Labor, et al,1 is an interesting, although in
itself a somewhat insignificant, link in the growing chain of decisions
introduced by the Exchange Bakery case.2 That case rested its decision
on principles in themselves startlingly new, and is illustrative of. a
method of approach, novel, in the solution of labor law problems.
In the Exchange Bakery case. the Court was presented with the
problem of passing upon the question of the legality of picketing,3 and
whether or not a labor union has the right to solicit for itself members,
in the manner there set forth. After deciding that the business of an-
other may be interfered with under certain justifiable conditions, the
means employed being as well lawful, the Court said:
"The purpose of a labor union, to improve the conditions
under which its members do their work; to increase their wages;
to assist them in other ways, may justify what would otherwise
be a wrong. So would an effort to increase its numbers and to
unionize an entire trade or business. It may be as interested in
the wages of those not its members, as in its own members, be-
cause of the influence of one upon the other. All engaged in a
trade are affected by the prevailing rate of wages. All, by the
principle of collective bargaining. * * * Where the end or the
means are unlawful and the damage has already been done, the
remedy is given by a criminal prosecution or by a recovery of
damages at law. Fquity is to be invoked only to give protection
for the future. To prevent repeated violations threatened or
probable of the complainant's property rights an injunction may
be granted."
1N. Y. L. J., Feb. 16, 1928.
2Exchange Bakery and Restaurant v. Rifkin, et al., 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N.E.
130 (1927). Plaintiff conducted a non-union restaurant employing therein
only non-union waitresses. These waitresses, at the time of hiring promised
not to join any union during the time of their employment. Defendant union
succeeded in procuring as union members four of the sixteen waitresses em-
ployed by the plaintiff, and at a prearranged signal called a strike. The
four waitresses stopped work immediately and the next day picketing began.
two union members patrolling the sidewalk in front of the premises carrying
placards with notice of the strike. There was no violence or disorder. Plain-
tiff procured an injunction which was reversed in the Appellate Division,
and sustained in the Court of Appeals, the Court holding that the agreement
not to join a union was unenforcible for lack of consideration-that therefore
the defendant was not guilty of inducing the breach of a contract.
3Supra note 1. The plaintiff not having shown violence, the picketing was
held lawful and would not be enjoined. For cases illustrating when picket-
ing will be enjoined see Stuyvesant Lunch & Bakery Corp. v. Reiner, 110
Misc. 357, 181 N. Y. Supp. 212 aff'd 192 App. Div. 951, 182 N. Y. Supp. 953
(1920); Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, 195 N. Y. Supp. 558 (1922); Schwartz
v. Hillman, 189 N. Y. Supp 21 (1921).
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in studying the prior decisions of the Court in its handling of labor
problems, by way of contrast to this case, it is interesting to note the
Court's explanation and application of the term 'justification." "Self
interest" is in reality the basis of such justification,' and there lies
therein a broadtess of outlook, a closer and truer realization and recog-
nition of the problem, not as a legal conflict between individuals,
but an economic one between two conflicting groups. This manifested
itself as a strong basis for the decision in the Lavin-' case in which the
Court following the Exchange Bakery decision, refused to grant an
injunction, saying:
"The defendants have the right to induce plaintiff's employees
to join Amalgamated Association though that may involve the
termination of their employment. They are under no obligation
to the plaintiff to inform it that some of the plaintiff's employees
are joining the Union so that plaintiff may, exercise its choice of
retaining or discharging the new members. They are not under
any obligation even to urge or compel their new members to give
their employer such information. The defendants are acting for
themselves and the Amalgamated Association, and in taking lawful
action to advance the interests of the members of that Union they
are under no affirmative duty of protecting the privileges or even
rights of the plaintiff."
In the Lazin case the Court was dealing with a contract "at will."
In that case there was no reciprocal, binding contract between employer
and employee, and the ruling laid (town is that in such cases there is no
paramount right of the employer to protection of his contract for hire,
since there is the right in the employee to terminate the contract at
will. The decision, therefore, in both of these proceedings established
clearly in such cases, the right of a labor union to solicit members for
itself, and sanctioned the method therein employed.
In the case at bar, plaintiff, the Interborough Rapid Transit Com-
pany, sought to enjoin the defendant from various acts claimed to be
illegal and in violation of a contract between the Brotherhood and its
4Cf., Dissenting opinion per Brandeis, J., in Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 479 (1921).
5Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin et al. 247 N. Y. 65 (Jan. 1928).
Plaintiff sued for an injunction which would in effect prohibit the defendants
from inducing the plaintiff's employees by lawful or unlawful means to leave
the plaintiff's employ. Plaintiff, a common carrier, brings this action against
defendants as representatives of the labor union. The Court of Appeals in
refusing to grant an injunction, said "Inducing the breach of a contriact is not
here involved * * *." The Court thereby again refusing to enforce an agree-
ment of an employee to refrain from joining a labor union, and refusing to
grant an injunction against such labor union prohibiting it from soliciting
members, among the plaintiff's employees.
NOTES AND COMMENT
individual members, employees of the plaintiff. Plaintiff is a common
carrier operating its transit lines in the City of New York. It had
formed a Brotherhood and had made it a condition precedent to employ-
ment that all employees join such Brotherhood, requiring also that the
employees promise to refrain from joining any other labor organization
during the term of their employment. The contract purported to give
employment for a definite stated period, but in other clauses the company
reserved to itself the right to dismiss the employee in certain specified
instances,--changing economic conditions, seasonal requirements, adop-
tion of new devices, etc. The defense interposed was that the contract
alleged was void and unenforceable by reason of fraud, duress and lack
of consideration, and that therefore .it should fail in equity. In the
Lavin case, which plaintiff sought to distinguish from the case at bar,
the plaintiff laid stress upon the decisions in the Hitchman8 case and
a line of cases 7 which held that contracts terminable at will were to
be protected against those inducing their breach, but the Court quite
properly refused to be bound by these decisions, and followed the Lavin
case, and the method of approach there employed, holding that the acts
of the defendants in inducing plaintiff's employees to join their union
were justifiable. In the language of the Court:
"It has not been established that violence, threats, fraud or
overreaching conduct have been used to induce plaintiff's em-
ployees to become members of the Amalgamated Association, nor
that other acts have been committed or threatened which would
warrant the issuance of a restraining order."
Hence, in the instant case the Court held that the contract purport-
ing to be a binding one. for a definite period of time, was not such, and
therefore, that it came within the rulings in the Lavin and Exchange
Bakery cases. The decision in itself adds nothing to the principles laid
down in the Exchange Bakery and Lavin cases. Its interest lies in the
manner of its-appieation-of-those cases. It distinguishes the facts before
it to bring them within the rule of the recent decisions. This approved
common law method of judicial legislation holds promise of the same
enlightened treatment of the question as yet unpassed upon,--the right
of a labor union to solicit members for itself, notwithstanding the estab-
lishment of a valid binding contract of employment for a definite stated
term. R. N.
6Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65
(1917).
71nternational Organization United Mine Workers of America v. Red
Jacket Consolidated Coke & Coal Co. 18 Fed. (2d) 839 (C.C.A. 4th 1927);
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353.
74 N. R. 603 (1905) ; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 AtI. 165
(1906); Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke. 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S.E. 161 (1906) ; Bixby
v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (1876).
